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Euthanasia: Some Points in a 
Philosophical Polemic I 
Luke Gormally 
The author is director of The Lincare Centre for the study of the ethics of 
health care, located in London, England. Gormally says, "The following 
text is a very lightly revised version of a talk given at a national conference 
on Euthanasia held in London, England on 11th March, 1989. The talk 
sought to develop, for a large general audience, some points in a 
philosophical polemic, against the background of contemporary British 
debate about euthanasia. I am gratefulfor advice in revising the text to 
John Finnis, to my colleagues Fred Fitzpatrick and Agneta Sutton, and 
especially to Mary Geach." 
In most societies there is an admixture of civilization and barbarism: the 
legal and political institutions of a society more or less adequately embody 
recognition of those principles which help to secure ways of living 
consistent with human dignity and the destiny of man. But every 'society 
falls short of securing, in its governancy of human relationships, that every 
human being be protected against arbitrary exercises of power. 
Our society is well-advanced on the road to systematic rejection of 
principles for the protection of human life which rest on a recognition of 
the dignity of every human being. This rejection is most conspicuously 
embodied in the legalization and widespread practice of abortion, and in a 
defense policy, adopted on our behalf by successive British governments, 
which depends on the conditional intention to murder innocent civilians. I 
shall argue in this talk that acceptance of the practice of voluntary 
euthanasia in our society would be a significant further step in the 
direction of barbarism, i.e. a state of affairs in which human beings, at 
times of great vulnerability, are no longer protected by the canons of 
justice, but are increasingly at the mercy of the arbitrary exercise of power. 
Civil authority, of course, exists to prevent this, not to promote it. 
Christian Vocation to Witness Truth 
Every Christian has a vocation to witness to that truth about man which 
is knowable through the works of creation as well as that which is revealed 
in the word of God. In face of the contemporary assault on human dignity, 
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it is urgent that Christians collaborate insofar as they can in this task of 
witness. 
My assignment, however, is not that of reflecting on revealed truths 
-the theological task undertaken by Dr. Cameron - but of offering on 
the topic of euthanasia some reflections which one would hope any man of 
good will could recognize as true without the benefit of revelation. The 
philosophical literature on euthanasia is beginning to be voluminous, so I 
shall have to be very selective about the points I cover in the time at my 
disposal. I have confined myself to a limited number of points in what one 
might call a philosophical polemic against euthanasia. In consequence a 
number of important issues are not addressed. 
I shall begin by focusing on voluntary euthanasia partly because the 
legalization of voluntary euthanasia is the immediate objective of the 
euthanasia movement. I shall seek to identify the fundamental reason 
which is made to bear the burden of justifying the killing of patients who 
ask for euthanasia. I will then go on to ask whether this is an acceptable 
reason for killing people, and whether, as a society, we can accommodate 
such killing consistent with the fundamental assumptions of our legal 
system. I shall argue that we cannot, and that not even the high value 
placed on autonomy in the liberal political tradition provides reason for 
legalizing voluntary euthanasia. Finally, I offer some reflections on the 
effect the practice of euthanasia would have on the practice of medicine. 
Definition of 'Voluntary Euthanasia' 
Let me begin by defining what I mean by "voluntary euthanasia". By 
"voluntary euthanasia" I mean the intentional causing of a patient's death 
or, more plainly, the intentional killing of a patient in the course of medical 
care , when the killing is carried out at the patient's request, and the patient 
is believed by a doctor to have good reason to be killed because of his or her 
present or foreseeable mental condition and quality of life. 
There are four elements to this definition of voluntary euthanasia. 
(I) First, it involves intentional killing: in other words a doctor aims to 
bring about a patient's death either by something he does, for example, by 
a lethal injection of a toxic substance, or by something he deliberately 
omits to do, precisely with a view to bringing about death .' He may, for 
example, fail to give a patient the nutrition he or she needs precisely in 
order to bring about his / her death; in other words, he may starve him / her 
to death (this is done to handicapped babies). Or he may withhold 
necessary life-prolonging treatment, which he had an obligation to 
provide, precisely in order to bring about death . So one can intentionally 
kill someone by deliberate omissions, by deliberate failures to act, just as 
much as by positive deeds. We should be clear that, in one way or another, 
euthanasia involves intentional killing. Euphemisms like "easing the 
passing" and "helping to die" are linguistic devices of the devil (or 
Orwellian "newspeak") designed to prevent clear thinking.2 
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(2) The second element in the definition of voluntary euthanasia is that the 
killing of the patient is in the course afmedical care. Clearly people other 
than doctors can kill patients for euthanasiast reasons . But proponents of 
voluntary euthanasia are particularly interested in having doctors kill 
patients as an accepted part of clinical practice. If we may judge by the 
evolution of abortion practice, it seems clear that nurses will come to be 
expected to playa prominent role in the execution of euthanasia. 
(3) The third element in the definition of voluntary euthanasia is that the 
killing is carried out at the patient's request. Proponents of voluntary 
euthanasia place great emphasis on the importance of the free, rational 
choice of the patient; and some of them insist that they have no wish to 
promote nonvoluntary euthanasia [i.e. the killing of patients, like babies, 
incapable of giving consent] or involuntary euthanasia [i.e. the killing of 
patients contrary to their wills]. But whatever the present attitudes of some 
proponents of voluntary euthanasia, I shall argue that if there are good 
grounds for regarding it as acceptable clinical practice then the most 
important objection to nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia will have 
been undermined. 
(4) The fourth and final element in the definition of euthanasia is that the 
patient is believed by a doctor to have good reason to be killed because of 
his or her present or foreseeable mental condition and quality of life. 
The existence of the request suggests that the patient believes she has 
good reason to be killed by a doctor. But it is the doctor who is to do the 
killing. It is the doctor, therefore, who needs to be satisfied that he has 
good reason to kill the patient. 
Erroneous View of Prognosis 
Requests for euthanasia, as is well known, may be prompted by a 
patient's erroneous view of her prognosis, or by depression that a doctor 
can readily see to be transient. So it is quite common for doctors who have 
no principled objection to euthanasia to nonetheless reject such requests. 
The mere fact of a request cannot itself provide a good reason for carrying 
out euthanasia. 
Some requests, however, seem to proponents of voluntary euthanasia to 
be rational, and to provide good reasons for doctors to kill patients. 
Typically, they have in mind the kind of patient who finds intolerable her 
extensive physical degeneration, perhaps involving immobility, and 
double incontinence. Her sense of worth and dignity has perhaps been 
closely tied up throughout her life with the independence she has enjoyed. 
Extreme dependence on careers makes life seem no longer worthwhile. 
There is a variety of conditions which can lead some people to think they 
no longer have worthwhile lives, and thus lead them to want others to end 
their lives. Does a patient's present or future quality of life provide a 
doctor, or, as it may come to be, a nurse, with good reason for killing that 
patient? Further, is it the kind of reason which our society should 
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recognize as acceptable either through a reform of the law designed to 
legalize voluntary euthanasia, or through the acceptance of a code of 
practice conformity to which, on the part of a doctor carrying out 
euthanasia, would ensure freedom from prosecution? These are the key 
questions. 
Throughout the history of human societies, certain types of killing have 
been thought to be justified. In the Western tradition of common morality, 
which has been deeply influenced by Jewish and Christian moral norms, a 
distinction is made between justified and unjustified killing. This 
distinction is fundamental to the legal framework of our societies, and in 
particular to the criminal law protecting the lives of all citizens. 
Underpinning the traditional distinction between justified and 
unjustified killing is the belief that all human beings are equal in dignity. 
What makes us equal in dignity is simply our humanity: all that we have in 
common is the fact that each of us is a human being. We vary enormously 
in capacities and achievements. But our fundamental rights do not depend 
on how well-endowed with talents we are nor on the level of ability we 
achieve. Unless it is the case that there is a basic dignity attaching to our 
humanity, then it becomes a matter of choice whom we treat in accordance 
with the requirements of justice. If human dignity is not believed to attach 
to our humanity but is made to be a matter of ability or achievement or a 
particular quality oflife, then we hand a "carte blanche" to the powerful to 
define which lives are not worthy of protection. 
Dignity of Every Human Being 
A society which wants to uphold justice in the treatment of all its 
members needs above all to hoJd on to an understanding of the 
fundamental dignity of every human being, and to resist any changes 
which would, in practice, subvert that understanding. 
The long-established belief that some forms of killing are morally 
acceptable relies on justifications consistent with upholding the dignity of 
every human being, whatever his or her conditions or circumstances. For 
the defense of killing in a just war, justly conducted, and the defense of 
capital punishment, after a properly conducted trial, rely on the 
proposition that those to be killed must in some sense deserve death. Now 
there are those who believe that death can never truly be deserved, as well 
as those who, while holding that it might in principle be deserved, object 
that it is not deserved by most soldiers in the army of an unjust aggressor or 
by certain criminals found guilty of capital offenses. But the important 
point to grasp for present purposes in considering the question of whether 
there ever can be justified intentional killing is this : the traditional defense 
of some forms of killing does not serve to undermine human dignity. 
Paradoxically, as it may seem, it assumes a very strong belief in human 
dignity. Only a man who knowlingly and willingly does grave wrong can be 
held answerable for it and can be said to deserve death. On the traditional 
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view of human dignity, human beings have a special dignity precisely 
because of the capacity inherent in human nature for knowing the 
difference between good and evil and for freely choosing which to do. 
Now let us remind ourselves again what is involved in involuntary 
euthanasia. One person, a patient, asks another person, a doctor, to kill 
him ur her. The mere fact of the patient's asking does not provide a good 
reason for complying with the request. What is supposed to provide a good 
reason is a patient's well-founded claim that she is suffering or expects to 
suffer serious degeneration, together with the belief that this degeneration 
is intolerable and incompatible with her sense of having a worthwhile life, 
a life of dignity as she has understood it. Such a patient has come to the 
view that she no longer has a worthwhile life, that such natural life as may 
be left to her will be devoid of dignity. 
Doctor's Two Questions 
There are two questions for a doctor confronted with such a request: 
- the first is: Is he prepared to agree that his patient, along with other 
patients, have not got worthwhile lives, that their lives are devoid of 
dignity? 
- the second question is: Does he think the judgment that a patient has 
not got a worthwhile life justifies him in killing that patient? 
If the doctor is ready to say "yes" to the first question then he has, as far 
as belief is concerned, jettisoned what is essential to the foundations of 
justice in our society: for the foundations of just ice, as we have seen, rest on 
the belief that every human being, just by virtue of being human, possesses 
an inalienable dignity. And that dignity stands in the way of one ever 
killing another human being for reasons other than the requirements of 
justice; that is for reasons which amount to a denial of the human dignity 
of that human being. 
If a doctor says 'Yes' to the second question and acts on that ·Yes' - in 
other words if he kills a patient because he agrees that she has not got a 
worthwhile life - then in the most decisive way possible he has made his 
own the view that not every human being enjoys a dignity which prevents 
us disposing of their lives for reasons of convenience. 
It is clear, I think, that what has to bear the burden ofjustiJying killing in 
voluntary euthanasia is the judgment that a patient lacks a worthwhile life, 
lacks value. If you subscribe to that judgment, you effectively deny that 
every human being has an inalienable dignity, just in virtue of his or her 
humanity. 
Members ofthe Euthanasia Movement are more or less clear-headed in 
recognizing that the justification even of voluntary euthanasia rests 
ultimately on the claim that some lives lack value. I have elsewhere 
published an analysis, which I shall not even summarize here, of the false 
understanding and false valuation of human life which underpins the 
Euthanasia MovemenP What I am now concerned to draw attention 
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to is that propagandists for euthanasia require us to jettison what is 
indisputably fundamental to the legal framework of our society: the view 
that all men are equal in dignity. 
Members of the Euthanasia Movement are not all clear-headed about 
the implications of their position. Some are disinclined to acknowledge 
that the justification of the killing they wish to see carried out in clinical 
practice must be a judgment on the value or worthwhileness of the patient's 
life. They protest that the doctor is merely accepting the patient's valuation 
of her own life. 4 But the question which has to be answered is: Is the doctor 
right to accept that valuation and so to kill the patient? One reason why 
some people clearly think that such a doctor would be right is because they 
believe that human life has indeed no given objective value; the value of 
each human life is to be determined by each indivicual human being. The 
belief of many euthanasiasts about a patient requesting euthanasia is that 
"If she says her life is worthless, then it is worthless." 
It is not necessary for present purposes to show why that view is gravely 
mistaken. I merely draw your attention to two of its implications. First, 
were the view taken really seriously in the practice of medicine, it would 
leave psychiatrists with little reason for seeking to prevent suicides. The 
second and more important implication is that if we have not got an 
objective worth given with our humanity, then all men are not equal in 
dignity. Do people in our society wish to embrace such a view? 
Since the real onus for justifying voluntary euthanasia is borne by the 
judgment that a patient has not got a worthwhile life, it is clear why 
voluntary euthanasia is a halfway house to non-voluntary and involuntary 
euthanasia. If a sufficiently powerful and influential group can define 
some people in society as lacking worthwhile lives, what good reason is 
there to prevent the killing ofthose unfortunates? No doubt there are some 
people in the Voluntary Euthanasia Movement who wish to halt at the 
halfway house; but there are others who want to move on to the 
elimination of the senile, the subnormal, and the seriously handicapped. 
Support for paediatric euthanasia, for example, is considerable. 
Enthusiasm for these grim ends is not an aberration in the Euthanasia 
Movement; it merely spells out the real logic of support for voluntary 
euthanasia. Once you begin to behave as if you have good reason to kill 
people when you judge they no longer have worthwhile lives, then why 
limit killing to those who ask for death? When you think that some human 
beings are lacking in all dignity, why should you respect their lives when 
you have power over them? As Chesterton perceptively observed many 
years ago: "Some are proposing what is called euthanasia; at present only a 
proposal for killing those who are a nuisance to themselves; but soon to be 
applied to those who are a nuisance to other people". 
Political Liberal's Argument 
The political liberal may persist in arguing that a man should be at 
liberty to satisfy any of his desires providing that in doing so he causes 
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no harm to his fellow human beings. Such liberty, it is claimed, is the 
precondition for, if not the substance of, autonomy and self-determination. 
I confine myself to three observations on this claim. 
The first is that voluntary euthanasia is not an exercise of autonomy or 
self-determination. The habit of thinking that it is is much encouraged by 
the deceptive expression "assisted suicide." But voluntary euthanasia is 
never a case of someone killing himself, but always a case of someone being 
killed by another person. And when we are asked to legalize it, we are being 
asked to accept that killing of ·one private citizen by another may be 
justified on the grounds that a human being's life lacks value, is not 
worthwhile. 
The second observation is that we do not value political freedom or 
liberty as a freedom to satisfy whatever desires people just happen to have. 
Our sense of the value of freedom arises from our sense of the importance 
of developing in such a way that we come to be able to distinguish between 
intrinsically worthwhile desires and worthless desires. "Satisfaction of 
some desires makes for human fulfillment, satisfaction of others for 
human misery. Insofar as human beings are able to identify with 
intrinsically worthwhile desires and to engage in stable commitments and 
projects in pursuit of the realization of those desires, they show themselves 
to be human beings who have achieved autonomy or a state of genuine 
self-determination. Political freedom is valuable in providing opportunity 
for the exercise of autonomy in this sense. 
"But this ideal development could not have been achieved without the 
existence of institutions (such as the family, the school, the university) 
which impose constraints conducive to the formation of genuinely 
autonomous persons. So the existence of autonomous agents presupposes 
constraints .. . . Now, clearly, one of the institutions whose constraints 
are conducive to the formation of the autonomous individual is the 
criminal law. Knowledge that one lives in a society governed by norms of 
justice provides a sense of elementary security, without which there cannot 
be that sense of belonging to a community which is so conducive to 
nurturing autonomy. It would be radically destructive ofthis arrangement 
if it became lawful to kill a person because 'he did not have a worthwhile 
life' .. .. So a true sense ofthe requirements of autonomy ought to lead us 
to reject the legalization of voluntary euthanasia."5 
My third comment on the political liberal's plea that a man should be at 
liberty to satisfy any of his desires providing that in doing so he causes no 
harm to his fellow human beings, is that satisfaction of the desire to be 
killed by a doctor does incalculable, harm to the doctor and thereby to the 
practice of medicine. The harm done to the doctor is that his character is 
deeply corrupted by his euthanasiast decision. 
Why should this be so? The practice of medicine necessarily exposes 
doctors to horrible things and obliges them to make tragic decisions. Why 
should the addition of euthanasia to a doctor's repertoire make such a 
difference to men who are in any case obliged, for instance, to balance the 
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likely death resulting from a treatment against the pain and trouble caused 
by withholding it? The explanation lies in a distinction of quite 
fundamental importance for understanding the moral life, a distinction 
which, however, is widely regarded by utilitarian philosophers as opaque. 
The distinction is between what I intentionally bring about and what I 
bring about as the foreseen consequence of what I intend. In general, what 
I intend to do is precisely what I choose to bring about, either as the end I 
am aiming to achieve or as the means necessary to secure my end. Choice is 
of quite central importance in our lives. One's choice of ends and of means 
manifests the dispositions of one's will - the directions in which one is 
inclined to move in life. And in making choices and commitments, one 
shapes and establishes dispositions, as well as giving expression to 
established dispositions. The dispositions which we form in ourselves 
through our Choices may be dispositions of a kind which better enable us to 
flourish as human beings in the way we are meant to flourish, or they may 
be destructive of our capacities to flourish, serving to head us in false 
directions in life. An example. In response to the invitation of the 
organizers of this conference, I chose to give this talk. In order to give the 
talk, I chose to prepare a text. My chosen end is making some contribution 
to your enlightenment. My chosen means is preparing and delivering the 
text. Both choices serve to give expression to, and perhaps even to deepen, 
a commitment to convey certain important truths, of which I think I have 
some understanding. 
But among the foreseeable consequences of my choices - all too 
foreseeable, I fear - are that I will induce bafflement in some, boredom in 
others, and others will go away with misunderstandings I did not seek to 
convey. Now, of course, I am not committed to achieving any of these 
results, nor others, such as tiredness in myself. They are results I will 
foreseeably produce, but they are not results which could count as 
evidence of what I want to achieve. They do not show the fundamentsl 
dispositions of my will, or shape those dispositions in desirable or 
undesirable directions . 
A voiding Consequences 
That does not mean, of course, that the boredom, bafflement and 
misunderstandings which arise in consequence of what I say are outside 
my control. Perhaps if I performed better, some of these consequences 
could be avoided. But let us suppose that I am speaking as well as I can 
speak about matters like this, but boredom, bafflement and misunder-
standings are nonetheless consequences, and foreseeable consequences, of 
what I am saying. It would still be the case that it would be within my 
control to avoid these consequences: by abandoning my choice to give the 
talk. 
The example illustrates the general distinction I have been seeking 
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to explain. Some of the things I bring about in acting I intend to bring 
about: they are the object of my choice. The objects of my choice are what 
in a full-blooded sense I want. What I want in this full-blooded sense both 
manifests and shapes those fundamental dispositions which constitute my 
character, a character which either enables me to flourish as a human being 
or disables me. 
Other things I bring about in acting, like most of the foreseeable 
consequences of what I do, I do not want in the same sense that I want my 
chosen end and means. The fact that I bring such consequences about - as 
boredom, bafflement and misunderstandings - does not serve to shape 
my dispositions of character. There is, however, a sense in which it may be 
said that I am willing they should come about: for I am aware that I could 
avoid bringing them about if I were to abandon my chosen end and means. 
The distinction between what I intend to bring about and what I am 
willing to allow to happen (as a consequence of actions which I have good 
reason to do) is of very great importance in medical ethics. Sometimes 
death is a consequence of what one does, not in the sense that it is the object 
of one's choice in a way which would make one into a killer, but rather in 
the sense that one is willing that death should occur because one had good 
reason to do, or refrain from doing, something in consequence of which 
death is foreseeable. 
The doctor who carries out euthanasia makes the death of the patient 
the object of his choice, at least in the sense that the death of the patient is 
the chosen means to end a life believed no longer worthwhile. But in 
making the death of the patient the object of his choice, the doctor 
profoundly shapes - and corrupts - his own dispositions. He makes his 
own the belief that some human beings lack dignity so that their lives may 
be disposed of without considerations of justice, and he acts on that belief: 
he becomes, morally speaking, a murderer. 
There is, by now, a substantial body of historical scholarship showing 
the connection between the practical acceptance, by many German 
doctors in the 1920s, of the beliefthat there are lives without value, devoid 
of dignity, no longer worthwhile, which issued in the practice of voluntary 
and non-voluntary euthanasia, and the subsequent complicity of many 
members of the medical profession in the more extensively murderous 
practices of the Nazis. The connection is simply that many of those doctors 
had already made themselves murderers: there was little or nothing in their 
beliefs, attitudes and character to stand in the way of such complicity. 
It is only an insane hubris, which feeds on illusions of moral 
respectability, which could induce us to believe that our own doctors could 
not be corrupted as those German doctors of the 1920s and 1930s were. 
Loss of Sense of Dignity 
The loss of a sense of the dignity of every human being is deeply 
corrupting to the practice of medicine and nursing. Human beings have 
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a claim on skilled care just because they are human beings and not because 
of status or achievement. Nor do they lose that claim because of debility or 
degeneration. 
Propaganda for euthanasia, when it adopts the rhetoric of political 
liberalism, when it speaks of everyone being entitled to the satisfaction of 
his desires in the name of autonomy, is symptomatic of the predicament of 
our age and the predicament of medicine in our age. The rhetoric of 
political liberalism is the voice of a culture of atomic individuals. The 
atomic, isolated individual - the condition of increasing numbers in our 
society - experiences degeneration and increasing dependency as 
tantamount to a radical loss of dignity. People in that state of mind do not 
think it possible they could be cherished and esteemed, whatever their 
condition. 
Human beings who believe that their dignity is essentially tied up with a 
particular quality oflife need, when they ask for euthanasia, to be cared for 
in ways which affirm their dignity and humanity, a dignity and humanity 
recognized in the face of debility, decay and dependency. In this way, some 
of them may be restored to a recognition of that truth about themselves 
from which they have been too long alienated: the deepest source of their 
dignity lies not in an ultimately fragile capacity for independence, but in 
the humanity they share with all other men and women. This dignity we 
receive in being created, so it rests not on our fragile capacity for 
independence but on a radical and unbreakable dependence on the one 
who created us. Our human task is to cherish each other in the 
consciousness of that common dependence and our common dignity. 
Because we live in a society which is characterized by profound moral 
differences, medicine as an institution is no longer sustained by a shared 
understanding of its proper and limited goal. In the consequent confusion, 
many doctors are .tempted to see themselves merely as possessors of a 
range of technical skills to be placed at the disposal of patients for the 
satisfaction of whatever desires patients want satisfied. 
In this perspective, euthanasia can become the final technical "fix" in the 
doctor's repertoire. Confronted by the demand for euthanasia from 
patients who are experiencing a profound loss of self-esteem, the doctor 
who is willing to offer it is in effect saying: What you no w think is correct; 
your lives are worthless, useless, without dignity. Better to end them. 
But this is not the truth about human beings. Even 'in extremis', in 
dependency and degeneration, they may yet glimpse the truth about their 
own dignity which has been hidden from them for the whole of their lives. 
Dying can be a time of truth if we accept, rather than revolt against, the 
dependency that goes with dying. Medicine should not aspire to rob us of 
this opportunity by offering, as its final technical "fix", killing which is 
premised on a radical rejection of human dignity.6 
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2. The chairman of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society has sought to argue that to 
describe voluntary euthanasia as killing betrays a blindness to conceptual distinctions: the 
distinction is as obvious, she says, as the distinction between rape and "making love". (See 
Jean Davies, "Raping and making love are different concepts: so are killing and voluntary 
euthanasia", in Journal of Medical Ethics 14 (1988) , 148-149.) "Making love" is itself a 
morally ambiguous euphemism, often employed in our society to describe sexual 
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intercourse whether in a marital relationship, in an adulterous relationship, or as 
fornication . Rape is defined as "unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman without her 
consent". It is distinguished from marital intercourse, adulterous intercourse and 
fornication by the absence of consent. But what it has in common with them is its being an 
act of sexual intercourse. Similarly, judicial execution of a man for a capital offense and 
euthanasia have it in common that they are acts of killing. The question of which ofthe acts, 
if any, is justified is not settled by the description of them as "killing", any more than a 
similar question is settled about acts which can all be described as "sexual intercourse" by 
the mere use o/that description (nor, for that matter, would it be settled if all the acts were 
euphemistically describable as "making love"). 
3. See Luke Gormally, "A Non-Utilitarian Case against Voluntary Euthanasia", in 
A. B. Downing and B. Smoker (eds.) Voluntary Euthanasia. London, Peter Owen 1986, 
72-95. 
4. For a position of the kind referred to, see the letter from Mrs. Jean Davies, 
chairperson of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, in IME Bulletin. No. 48, (March 1989), 
p. 2; see my reply in IME Bulletin. No. 50, (May 1989), p. 2. 
5. In these two paragraphs I repeat something of what I say at pp. 84-85 of the article 
cited in Note 2 . . 
6. After my criticism ofthe BMA Report in Note I above, I should like to acknowledge 
that the Report contains paragraphs which finely express the profound inappropriateness 
of euthanasia as a solution to the human predicament of adult patients who are dying in 
pain and distress. Particularly notable among these paragraphs is 146: 
It is precisely because human life has depths, and a value that may take fresh and 
unexpected form, even up until the moment of death, that it must not be cut short. 
This commitment to the preservation of life must be tempered with a sensitivity to 
the wishes and experiences of the dying patient. That sensitivity, indeed 
reverence, may be blunted, as medical sensitivities so often are, when there rs an 
accepted "treatment to be offered rather than an ethically demanding situation to 
be confronted. Opting for a "treatment" - voluntary euthanasia - which can be 
administered given certain indications precipitates the danger of substituting a 
technique (which draws on professional skill) for a human response in the midst 
of a deeply human experience which, above all, requires us to draw on our full 
character as human beings. This implies that a reference for persons, and for the 
way that we ought to relate to persons in need and for the kinds of persons we 
want our doctors to be, tells against rather than/or euthanasia." 
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